In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Heirs of Plato: A Study of the Old Academy (347–274 BC)Carlos SteelJohn M. Dillon. The Heirs of Plato: A Study of the Old Academy (347–274 BC). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003. Pp. x + 252. Cloth, $65.00.When Plato died, in 347 BC, he left behind not only the collection of philosophical dialogues we still read with admiration, but also a remarkable organization, the "Academy," wherein his students continued (...) the discussion he had initiated. Dillon's latest book is an attempt to recreate the intellectual climate in the Academy during the first generations after Plato's death, the "Old Academy," called thus to distinguish it from the "New Academy," which started with Arcesilaus in the mid 270's, who abandoned doctrinal speculations for a sceptical stance. Given the elusive nature of the dialogues, the interpretation of Plato's philosophy has been controversial from the beginning. Therefore, scholars always have been eager to know in which direction Plato's first successors—Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo—took the Academy; thus they hoped to find some justification for their own interpretation of Plato. Unfortunately, our information on the doctrines of Plato's first successors is scarce. Browsing through the fragments collected by scholars, one may be tempted to conclude that it is not such a great disaster that most texts of the Old Academy have been lost. For it seems that the Academy after Plato was leaning towards a rather esoteric metaphysical speculation about the first principles, which makes us lament on what has become of the philosophical heritage of Plato, a genius fallen into the hands of epigones. One gets the impression that the original and refreshing philosophical contributions came from outside the Academy, from the Lyceum founded by Aristotle and continued by Theophrastus, and later from Epicurus and Zeno and their new schools, which will dominate the Hellenistic period. This, however, is not the view of Dillon: "It will be the thesis of this book that Speusippus and Xenocrates set the agenda for what was to become, over the succeeding centuries, the intellectual tradition which we call Platonism" (v). Even early Stoicism is, in Dillon's view, a "development and formalization of contemporary Platonism" (235).In an introductory chapter Dillon discusses the location and juridical structure of the Academy and gives a general survey of the main doctrines of the school. The following three chapters present the lives, work and thought of the first heads of the Academy; a final chapter is devoted to some minor members of the early Academy. The book concludes with a short epilogue on Arcesilaus and the reasons for his turn to scepticism. Dillon is an [End Page 204] excellent writer who knows how to tease out and expound the most abstruse philosophical doctrines in a captivating way, mixing, as he does here, biographical anecdotes and witty comments with a sharp analysis of arguments and a speculative reconstruction of lost doctrines. I doubt, however, whether this book will become such a classic as his celebrated The Middle Platonists (Ithaca, 1977).My first worry is anticipated by Dillon himself: "This is perforce a rather speculative book, and no doubt it will be criticized for that" (vii). Dillon defends himself against this critique: I have tried, he says, "to put the most favourable construction on the evidence available to us," his assumption being that the figures he is dealing with "were not philosophical imbeciles"(vii). My reservations are not about Dillon's attempt to construct a coherent doctrine using all relevant information on an author, but about his method of reconstruction, in particular his speculation and his preference for often questionable later material to fill the gaps in our information. "With a good deal of speculation, our exiguous information on Polemo's philosophical position can be fleshed out somewhat" (176). Thus, in his exposition of Speusippus's doctrine of the first principles, Dillon does not start from Aristotle, considering him too biased, but from chapter 4 of Iamblichus's treatise De communi mathematica scientia. In this Neo-Pythagorean treatise, Speusippus is not even mentioned. Even if there are arguments, as Dillon believes, to attribute the doctrine of Chapter 4 to Speusippus, one should... (shrink)

In this paper we consider an intuitionistic variant of the modal logic S4 (which we call IS4). The novelty of this paper is that we place particular importance on the natural deduction formulation of IS4 -- our formulation has several important metatheoretic properties. In addition, we study models of IS4 -- not in the framework of Kripke semantics, but in the more general framework of category theory. This allows not only a more abstract definition of a whole class of models (...) but also a means of modelling proofs as well as provability. (shrink)

Topics in Cognitive Science, Volume 14, Issue 1, Page 163-188, January 2022.

Knowledge of the ethical and legal basis of medicine is as essential to clinical practice as an understanding of basic medical sciences. In the UK, the General Medical Council requires that medical graduates behave according to ethical and legal principles and must know about and comply with the GMC’s ethical guidance and standards. We suggest that these standards can only be achieved when the teaching and learning of medical ethics, law and professionalism are fundamental to, and thoroughly integrated both vertically (...) and horizontally throughout, the curricula of all medical schools as a shared obligation of all teachers. The GMC also requires that each medical school provides adequate teaching time and resources to achieve the above. We reiterate that the adequate provision and coordination of teaching and learning of ethics and law requires at least one full-time senior academic in ethics and law with relevant professional and academic expertise. In this paper we set out an updated indicative core content of learning for medical ethics and law in UK medical schools and describe its origins and the consultative process by which it was achieved. (shrink)

Aristotle argued that you need some wealth to live well. The Stoics argued that you could live well with or without wealth. But the Cynics argued that wealth is a hinderance. For the Cynics, a good life consists in self-sufficiency, or being able to rule and help yourself. You accomplish this by living simply and naturally, and by subjecting yourself to rigorous philosophical exercises. Cynics confronted people to get them to abandon extraneous possessions and positions of power to live better. (...) And while the Cynics were experts in living in this way, their ascetic lifestyles made their message curious to some audiences. This paper reflects on Cynic ascetic practices and the ways others perceived them. (shrink)

Traditionally clinicians have determined their patients' resuscitation status without consultation. This has been condemned as morally indefensible in cases where not for resuscitation (NFR) orders are based on quality of life considerations and when the patient's true wishes are not known. Such instances would encompass most resuscitation decisions in elderly patients. Having previously involved patients in CPR decision-making, we chose formally to explore the reasons behind the choices made. Although the patients were not upset, and readily decided at the time (...) of initial consultation, on later analysing the decision-making we found poor understanding of the procedure, poor recall of information given and in some cases evidence of harm. This may be attributed to impaired decision-making capacity of elderly hospitalised patients as previously shown, or to the discomfort precipitated by having to contemplate the apparent immediacy of cardiac arrest by these patients. We propose that subscribing to autonomy as a general principle needs to be balanced against particular cases where distress may be caused by, or result in, diminished competence and limited autonomy. (shrink)

In this paper we consider an intuitionistic variant of the modal logic S4 (which we call IS4). The novelty of this paper is that we place particular importance on the natural deduction formulation of IS4— our formulation has several important metatheoretic properties. In addition, we study models of IS4— not in the framework of Kirpke semantics, but in the more general framework of category theory. This allows not only a more abstract definition of a whole class of models but also (...) a means of modelling proofs as well as provability. (shrink)

Next SectionFollowing the influential Gifford and Reith lectures by Onora O’Neill, this paper explores further the paradigm of individual autonomy which has been so dominant in bioethics until recently and concurs that it is an aberrant application and that conceptions of individual autonomy cannot provide a sufficient and convincing starting point for ethics within medical practice. We suggest that revision of the operational definition of patient autonomy is required for the twenty first century. We follow O’Neill in recommending a principled (...) version of patient autonomy, which for us involves the provision of sufficient and understandable information and space for patients, who have the capacity to make a settled choice about medical interventions on themselves, to do so responsibly in a manner considerate to others. We test it against the patient–doctor relationship in which each fully respects the autonomy of the other based on an unspoken covenant and bilateral trust between the doctor and patient. Indeed we consider that the dominance of the individual autonomy paradigm harmed that relationship. Although it seems to eliminate any residue of medical paternalism we suggest that it has tended to replace it with an equally (or possibly even more) unacceptable bioethical paternalism. In addition it may, for example, lead some doctors to consider mistakenly that unthinking acquiescence to a requested intervention against their clinical judgement is honouring “patient autonomy” when it is, in fact, abrogation of their duty as doctors. (shrink)

In _Violence and Civility_, Étienne Balibar boldly confronts the insidious causes of violence, racism, nationalism, and ethnic cleansing worldwide, as well as mass poverty and dispossession. Through a novel synthesis of theory and empirical studies of contemporary violence, the acclaimed thinker pushes past the limits of political philosophy to reconceive war, revolution, sovereignty, and class. Through the pathbreaking thought of Derrida, Balibar builds a topography of cruelty converted into extremism by ideology, juxtaposing its subjective forms and its objective manifestations. Engaging (...) with Marx, Hegel, Hobbes, Clausewitz, Schmitt, and Luxemburg, Balibar introduces a new, productive understanding of politics as antiviolence and a fresh approach to achieving and sustaining civility. Rooted in the principles of transformation and empowerment, this theory brings hope to a world increasingly divided even as it draws closer together. (shrink)

To speak of ‘the real subject’ or ‘the primary aim’ of a Platonic dialogue usually means to magnify one aspect of it at the expense of other aspects as important. Such is not my intention. It is quite clear, however, without prejudice to the philosophic value of any of the topics discussed, that the Protagoras is an attack upon the sophists as represented by Protagoras, the greatest of them. Hippias and Prodicus are present and some of the great man's glory (...) is reflected upon them; they are also no doubt to some extent implicated in his defeat, though they seem quite unaware of the fact. (shrink)